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CAL-DAK Co. v. SAv-ON DRuGs, INc.

[L. A. No. 22168.

In Bank.

[40 C.2d

Mar. 17, 1953.]

'fHE CAL-DAK COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v.
SAV-ON DRUGS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Monopolies-Fair 'frade Laws-Acts Violating.-Acts of defendant retailer in offering clothes baskets for sale at prices
below price fixed by plaintiff manufacturer in agreements
with its jobbers constitute a violation of the Fair Trade Act.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900 et seq.)
[2] !d.-Fair Trade Laws-Violation as Unfair Competition.Violation under Fair Trade Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900
et seq.) of a contract relating to the resale of a commodity
which bears a trademark is unfair competition and actionable even though the violator is not a party to the contract
and did not sign it.
[3] !d.-Fair Trade Laws-Injunctive Relief.-Since 1952 amendment of Miller-Tydings Amendment to Sherman Anti-Trust
Act exempts from latter statute state laws giving validity
to price fixing contracts and making them binding on nonsigners, a preliminary injunction against a retailer violating
our Fair Trade Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900 et seq.) may
be granted regardless of whether or not interstate commerce
is involved.
[ 4] Injunctions-Preliminary Injunction.-A preliminary injunction is aimed at preventing conduct after issuance of the injunction and likely to occur during pendency of the action.
[5] Appeal-Review-Matters After Judgment or Order Appealed
from.-Relief by injunction operates in futuro, and on an
appeal involving such relief the right thereto must be determined as of the date of decision by the appellate court.
[6] Monopolies-Fair Trade Laws-Injunctive Relief-AppeaLWhere trial court in action by manufacturer seeking injunctive relief and damages against retailer for violation of Fair
Trade Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900 et seq.) has not
passed on question of whether defendant threatened to continue its acts during pendency of action, the appropriate pro[1] Right of manufacturer, producer or wholesaler to control
retail price, notes, 7 A.L.R. 449 ; 19 A.L.R. 925; 32 A.L.R. 1087;
103 A.L.R. 1331; 104 A.L.R. 1452; 106 A.L.R. 1486; 110 A.L.R.
1413; 125 A.L.R. 1335. See, also, Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1948
Rev.), Monopolies and Combinations, § 10; Am.Jur., Monopolies,
Combinations and Restraints on Trade, § 28.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 6, 7] Monopolies, § 14; [4] Injunctions, §50; [5] Appeal and Error, § 972.
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cedure, on appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction, is to remand the case to the trial court for such
proceedings as are proper in the light of the 1952 change
in the Miller-Tydings Amendment to Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.

[7] Id.-Fair Trade Laws-Injunctive Relief and Damages-AppeaL-On appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction in action by manufacturer for injunctive relief and
damages against retailer for violation of Fair Trade Act (Bus.
& Prof. Code,§ 1G900 et seq.), the question of damages claimed
hy plaintiff by reason of defendant's alleged improper conduct prior to 1952 change in the lVIiller-Tydings Amendment
to Sherman Anti-Trust Act is not before the court for consideration, and inasmuch as the issue of whether interstate
commerce was involved at such time is a mixed factual and
legal question, it would be more appropriate to determine this
issue on the trial of the action rather than on bare allegations in the pleadings.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County denying application for a preliminary injunction. l<'rank G. Swain, ,Tudge. Reversed with directions.
Landels & vVeigel, 0 'Connor & 0 'Connor and Stanley A.
Weigel for Appellant.
Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd Wright and Herschel B. Green for Respondent.
CAllTEH, .J.-Plaintiff' appeals from an order denying its
application for a preliminary injunction in an action seeking
injunc·i:ive relief and damages.
Plaintiff is a Califoruia corporation engaged in the manufaeture and sale o£ clothes baskets under the trade name
"Sav-Ur-Bak Clothes Basket." Defendant is a California
corporation engaged in this state in the operation of retail
drugstores. Defendant bought some of the clothes baskets
from plaintiff's jobber in this state and has offered them for
sale at retail in its stores at prices below the retail price fixed
by plaintifi in agreements with its jobbers. Plaintiff commenced this action asking for an injunction and alleged that
it had suffered damages because of defendant's conduct. Its
application for a preliminary injunction was denied.
[1] It is clear according to plaintiff's complaint that defendant's acts in offering the baskets for sale below the price
fixed is a violation of the Pair 'frade Act (Bus. & Prof. Code,
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§ 16900 et seq.) for thereunder a contract relating to the resale of a commodity which bears a trademark may provide
that the buyer will not resell except at the price stipulated
by the vendor.* [2] And the violation of the contract IS
unfair competition and actionable even though the violator IS
not a party to the contract-did not sign it. 1 Defendant 1s
not a party to the contract between plaintiff and its jobber.
Defendant, however, invokes the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
(15 U.S.O.A., § 1) as invalidating such contracts and urges
that the Miller-'l'ydings Amendment to that act 2 purporting
*"(a) No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity
which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark,
brand, or name of the producer or owner of such commodity and which
is in fair and open competition with commodities of the same general
class produced by others violates any law of this State by reason of any
of the following provisions which may be contained in such contract:
"(1) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price
stipulated by the vendor.
'' (2) That the vendee or producer require the person to whom he may
resell such commodity to agree that he will not, in turn, resell except at
the price stipulated by such vendor or by such vendee.
"(b) Such provisions in any contract imply conditions that such
commodity may be resold without reference to such agreement in the
following cases:
"(1) In closing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing
delivering any such commodity.
"(2) When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, and
notice is given to the public thereof.
" ( 3) By any officer acting under the orders of any court." (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 16902.)
1
" Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into
pursuant to this chapter, whether the person so advertising, offering for
sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition
and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.'' (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 16904.)
2
' 'Provided, That nothing contained in sections 1-7 of this title shall
render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for
the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which
bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of
such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others,
when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied
to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now
or hereafter in effect in any State, 'rerritory, or the District of Columbia
in which such resale is to be made. or to which the commoditv is to he
transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts. or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition under section 4;'i of
this title: Provided further, That the preceding proviso shall not make
lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or
maintenance of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved,
between manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or
between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between
persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other." (15
U.S.C.A., § 1.)
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to exempt such contracts from the Sherman Act does not extend to nonsigners as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Schwegm.ann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 LT.S. 384 [71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035, 19 A.L.R.2d 1119].
It vvas held in that case that where interstate commerce is involved such contracts violate the Sherman Act and that the
Miller-Tydings amendment thereto, while exempting the
parties to the contract from the Sherman Act, does not extend
to nonsigners of the contract. Hence the state Fair Trade
Act embracing nonsigners can have no application where
interstate commerce is involved. The sole issue presented on
the application for a preliminary injunction was, therefore,
whether interstate commerce was involved, thus making the
federal statutes applicable.
On this question, as above shown, the baskets were manufactured in California by plaintiff, a California corporation,
and were sold by plaintiff to its jobber in this state and its
jobber sold and delivered them to defendant, who offers them
for retail sale, all in this state. There are additional factors,
however, as appears from defendant's answer where it is
alleged: " . . . plaintiff's said clothes baskets are sold by
jobbers throughout the United States. That said jobbers own
and operate their establishments within and without the State
of California. That a great majority of plaintiff's said clothes
baskets are sold to Jewel Tea Company in Chicago, Illinois.
'l'hat the said Jewel Tea Company sells plaintiff's said clothes
baskets throughout the United States. That plaintiff maintains an office and is conducting business in the City of
Chicago, State of Illinois. That in the purchase of materials
used by plaintiff in the manufacture of its clothes baskets
outside the State of California, the shipment by plaintiff of
its said clothes baskets to its office and place of business in
Chicago, Illinois, the shipment by plaintiff of said clothes
baskets to jobbers in Illinois and in other states and in the
transaction of business in its Chicago office, plaintiff has been
since 1937 and is now continuously engaged in interstate commerce.''
The application for a preliminary injunction was denied
on August 10, 1951. This appeal was taken from the order
of denial. Thereafter Congress amended (approved July 19,
1952) the Miller-Tydings. amendment to the Sherman Act to
exempt from the latter, state laws such as ours giving validity
to price fixing contracts and making them binding on non-
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signers; it in effect nullifies the Schwegmann case.* [3] It is
not disputed that under the 1952 law nonsigners are bound by
our state Fair Trade Act, snpm, and thus thereunder a preliminary injunction could have been properly granted regardless
of whether or not interstate commerce is involved. [ 4] This
is true because a preliminary injunction (here we have an
order denying such an injunction) is aimed at preventing
future condlict-conduct after the issuance of the injunction
and likely to occur during the pendency of the action. [5] "Relief by injunction operates in futuro, and the right to it must
<·''That it is the purpose of this Act to protect the rights of States
under the United States Constitution to regulate their internal affairs
and more particularly to enact statutes and laws, and to adopt policies,
which authorize eontraets and agreements prescribing minimum or stipulateu prices for the resale of commodities and to extend the rninimum or·
stip~~lated

prices prescribed by such contracts and agreernents to persons
who are not parties thereto. It is the further purpose of this Act to
permit sueh statutes, laws, and public policies to apply to commodities,
contracts, agreements, and activities in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce . . .
"(2) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts
shall render unlawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum
or stipulated prices, or requiring a vendee to enter into contracts or
agreements prescribh1g minimum or stipulated prices, for the resale of a
commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the
trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of
the same general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts
or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate
transactions under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in
effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such
resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for
such resale.
" ( 3) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts
shall render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or
right of action created by any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia,
which in substance provides that willfully and knowmgly advertising,
offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price or
prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the peTson so
advertising, offeTing for sale, or selling is OT is not a party to such a
contract or ag1·eement, is tmfair competition and is actionable at the suit
of any person damaged thereby.
" '(4) Neither the making of contracts or agreements as described in
paragraph (2) of this subsection, nor the exercise or enforcement of any
right or right of action as described in paragraph (3) of this subsection shall constitute an unlawful buruen or restraint upon, or interference with, commerce.
" '(5) Nothing contamed in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall
make lawful contracts or agreements providing for the establishment
or maintenance of minimum or stipulated res::tle prices on any commodity
referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection, between manufacturers,
or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or
between factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other.' " (Emphasis added.) (Pub.
Law 542, 82d Congress, ch. 745, 2d sess.)
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be determined as of the date of decision by an appellate
court." (American Fntit Growers v. Parker, 22 Oal.2d 513, 515
[140 P.2d 23]; also Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746,754 [155
P.2d 3431; Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 82 CaLApp.2d
45 [185 P.2d 393] ; Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore
Irr. Dist., 3 Cal.2d 489 [42 P.2d 972]; Brophy v. Employers
Retirement System, 71 Cal.App.2d 455 [162 P.2d 939];
Diederichsen v. Sutch, 47 Cal.App.2d 646 [118 P.2d 863] .)
Defendant asserts, however, that it does not intend to do
the acts charged during the pendency of the action and there
is nothing to show it does; hence a preliminary injunction is
not proper. The application for the injunction was made and
decided upon the verified pleadings of the parties and while
plaintiff alleged that defendant threatened to and would continue his improper conduct, that was denied by defendant
and the parties rested their cases and the trial court based
its denial of the injunction solely on the ground that, as interstate commerce was involved, no injunction would lie in any
event under the Sherman Act, the Miller-Tydings amendment
and the Schwegmann case, which as we have seen is no longer
the crucial issue. [6] The trial court has never passed on the
question of whether defendant threatened to continue its acts
during the pendency of the action. Hence the appropriate procedure is to reverse the order denying the preliminary injunction and remand the case to the trial court for such proceedings
as are proper in the light of the 1952 change in the law.
[7] There still remains in the case the question of the
damages claimed by plaintiff by reason of defendant's alleged
improper conduct prior to the 1952 change in the law, which,
as above noted, requires the determination as to whether or
not interstate commerce was involved, because if it was, defendant's conduct would not have been improper. Those
questions are not before the court at this time, however, because we are considering an appeal from an order denying
a preliminary injunction. Moreover, inasmuch as the issue of whether interstate commerce is involved is a mixed
factual and legal question, it would be more appropriate to
determine this issue on the trial of the action rather than
on the bare allegations in the pleadings.
The order is reversed and the cause is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings as may be proper, giving
consideration to the 1952 change in the law.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

